Belarus-Ukraine: War Without War

Yevhen Mahda

Summary

In 2022, relations between Belarus and Ukraine shifted to an entirely new level. Lukashenko’s regime positioned itself as a collaborator in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, while the Ukrainian leadership has found no opportunity for dialogue with Belarusian democratic forces in exile.

Armed units established by Belarusian citizens emerged within the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Trends:

Trade before the war

In 2022, relations between Belarus and Ukraine started on a contradictory note. While Ukraine, consistent with its stance from the previous year, did not recognize Aleksandr Lukashenko as the legitimate president, it continued to actively trade with Minsk. By the end of 2021, Belarus enjoyed a favorable trade balance with Ukraine, amounting to $2.9 billion.1 This situation drew criticism from Belarusian politicians and activists who accused Ukraine of political hypocrisy.

By 2022, trade between Belarus and Ukraine plummeted due to the onset of hostilities, border closures, and Minsk’s support for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian customs service, trade turnover between the countries decreased by 74% from the previous year to $1.6 billion,2 which is markedly lower than Belarus’ leading trade partners.3

In an interview with Russian TV propagandist Vladimir Solovyov, A. Lukashenko promised to stop the export of electricity and fuel and lubricant materials to Ukraine in the event of a war. This is exactly what happened, for in 2022 Belarus has effectively become the “exporter” of Russian military into Ukraine.

Belarusian army: a passive contributor

Aleksandr Lukashenko appears to have been briefed on Russia’s impending actions against Ukraine. He formally initiated the «Union Resolve» exercise, which commenced in January 2022 on Belarusian soil. His conversation with Solovyov in early February 2022 hints at this foreknowledge. The self-proclaimed president of Belarus anticipated Ukraine’s downfall, asserting that the «Belarusian army will act like the Russian one».4

Despite this statement and periodic reports in the Ukrainian media about the possibility of direct involvement of Belarusian troops in Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, no tangible evidence materialized over the year. Official Kyiv remained silent on the matter. However, there were instances of Belarusian nationals engaging in combat alongside the invading forces as part of private military companies.

Several factors explain why the Belarusian Armed Forces refrained from the direct participation in the invasion of Ukraine:

Belarus, however, has become the logistical hub for Russian aggression against Ukraine. Russian troops were stationed within its borders, underwent combat training, treated the wounded, and repaired military equipment. Hundreds of Russian missiles targeting Ukrainian sites were launched from Belarusian territory.

Partisan and Frontline Belarus

The creation of a regiment named after Kastus Kalinouski Regiment could be seen as one of the factors that prevented Belarusian-Ukrainian relations from deteriorating completely. The formation of this unit, the death of some of its founders (Ivan Marchuk, call sign «Brest», died in the summer of 2022 near Lysychansk), and the various challenges the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment faced have significantly impacted Belarusian-Ukrainian ties.

The PKK’s political ambitions also became evident, highlighted by the emergence of the political representative Dzmitry Shchygelski, who was previously associated with the «Cyber Partisans» and «Supratiu» movements.

A less-discussed aspect of Belarusian-Ukrainian relations after the Russian invasion are the attempts of the railroad partisans to hinder the movement of Russian troops through Belarus. Predictably, the Belarusian security forces thwarted these attempts with particular brutality, demonstrating Lukashenko’s fragile grip on the political situation in Belarus.

The unfolding events of the Russo-Ukrainian war, and the complicity of official Minsk dissolved any semblance of cordiality in Belarusian-Ukrainian relations. According to a survey by the «Rating» group, only 22% of Ukrainians expressed positive sentiments towards Belarusians, with 33% holding negative views, and 42% being neutral.6 This attitude is partly explained by the changing socio-political environment during the war, and the fact that the survey was conducted soon after the liberation of the Ukrainian territory bordering Belarus. For many Ukrainians, Belarus is associated with Aleksandr Lukashenko, and the attitude towards him extends to the entire Belarusian populace.

Diplomacy: negotiation and propaganda

In the early stages of the invasion, Minsk positioned itself as a venue for negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Three rounds of negotiations (on February 28th, March 3rd, and March 7th, 2022) took place on the territory of Belarus, with Russian and Ukrainian delegations arriving through predetermined routes. However, Lukashenko’s aspirations to emerge as a mediator, continuing the legacy of the «Minsk format», did not materialize - largely due to his diminished legitimacy after 2020 and his proximity to the Russian sphere of influence.

Belarusian propaganda, especially in broadcasts by pundit Ryhor Azaronak has adopted anti-Ukrainian narratives, mimicking the style of Russian propaganda. Lukashenko’s claims about Ukraine’s aggressive plans against Belarus quickly became a meme.

Nonetheless, diplomatic relations between Belarus and Ukraine persisted despite the complete evacuation of Belarusian embassy staff from Kyiv. Ukrainian Ambassador to Belarus Ihor Kyzym continued to perform his functions in Minsk, even though the number of diplomatic personnel there has been significantly reduced. This experienced diplomat continued to work in a country that had previously shown animosity towards him, all the while demonstrating a clear understanding of the Belarusian situation.

Diplomacy is often personified, so the sudden death of Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Makei further curtailed the already limited channels of communication between Belarus and the outside world.

Rhetoric of Democratic Forces and Kyiv’s Behavior

The large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine compelled Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya to change her rhetoric, as condemned the Kremlin’s actions from the outset. However, it would be a stretch to talk about it as a serious breakthrough in the Ukrainian direction for Tsikhanouskaya, the most prominent Belarusian political figure outside Belarus. Tsikhanouskaya never managed to get a meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. The issue is not so much tied to Tsikhanouskaya’s overly positive portrayal of the actions of the Belarusian military (both among the Armed Forces of Ukraine7 and those within the Belarusian army8) but more to the apparent lack of political will from official Kyiv.

Tsikhanouskaya had to make do with a meeting with Oleksii Arestovych, adviser to the head of the Presidential Office of Ukraine.9 Instead of a permanent representation of Tsikhanouskaya’s office in Kyiv, Valery Kovalevsky, a member of the United Tsikhanouskaya Cabinet, had to build relations with the Ukrainian authorities at irregular opportunities.

It should be noted that in 2022, the veteran of Belarusian politics Zianon Pazniak became active again. While his criticism of Tsikhanouskaya and his unwavering conservative agenda are well-known to Belarusians, they likely are not compelling enough to initiate dialogue with the Ukrainian authorities.

Conclusion: Perspective for 2023

December 2022 was punctuated by two significant events that shape forecasts for Belarusian-Ukrainian relations in 2023.

On December 9-11, the Belarus-Ukraine Expert Forum named after the Ostrogski Princes took place in Lviv, acting as a venue for discussing the future of bilateral relations. It is worth noting that representatives of the United Transitional Cabinet, Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, Ukrainian parliamentarians, and experts from both nations took part in it (for obvious reasons, only Belarusian citizens in exile attended the forum in Lviv). One could say, this was the first attempt to find ways of restoring relations between Belarusian and Ukrainian societies since state-level communications are close to freezing.

Between December 17-23, under the auspices of the Ukrainian Center for Countering Disinformation, the “Belarus 2030” foresight session was conducted in Sinai, Romania. The gathering, attended by delegates from nearly all Belarusian democratic factions later caused a noticeable resonance within the Belarusian democratic community.

In 2023, relations between Belarus and Ukraine are unlikely to improve, given the tensions in the «Lukashenko - official Kyiv - Belarusian democratic forces» triangle.

There should be no illusions about the possibility of a military intervention into Belarus from Ukraine. Simultaneously, the potential direct involvement of the Belarusian army in Russian aggression would eliminate the chances of mending ties in the near future.

For Ukraine, the primary aim should be to foster connections with exiled representatives of the Belarusian democratic forces and to relay a clear message to Lukashenko that business as usual is impossible in the future. The tenet “Without independent Ukraine, there is no independent Belarus. Without a democratic Belarus there is no secure Europe» underpins these bilateral relations.

Belarus and Ukraine are on the verge of establishing themselves as sovereign nation-states; 2023 may become the final stretch in this process.