Belarusian Army In Times of War

Alena Kudzko

Summary

In 2022, the security situation in Belarus deteriorated sharply in light of the war in Ukraine. Belarus' support for Russia during the conflict negated any semblance of its neutrality. Following the growth of military integration with Russia, both in action and legislation", Belarus' autonomy as a sovereign actor has dwindled significantly. By the year's end, the perception of Belarus as a subservient ally to Russia, especially for security and military objectives, became even more entrenched.

Trends:

Role of Belarus in the war

In February 2022, Russia launched a full-scale war in Ukraine, with Belarus acting as a supporter of the aggressor.
Belarus' participation in the Ukraine war served Russia's immediate and strategic needs, even if it ran counter to Belarus' national interests.

Belarus as an enabler of Russian operations

Masked as a joint military exercise named "Allied Resolve – 2022," Russian forces amassed in Belarus weeks before using it as a springboard for their campaign against Kyiv. Inconsistent statements from Belarusian officials about the presence of Russian troops suggested they were likely in the dark about Moscow's plans.

Throughout 2022, Belarus played an active military role in the conflict, providing land, air, and logistical support, infrastructure for troop stationing, refueling and repair facilities, medical aid to Russian forces, and, eventually, equipment and ammunition. Aerial strikes launched from Belarus were notably significant in the war's early phases, but continued throughout the year

Belarus as equipment provider

As the Russian industrial facilities were unable to meet the needs of their armed forces, Russia applied to Belarus for military supplies. Reports indicated that Belarus transferred a variety of weaponry and ammunition to Russia, including older T-72A tanks, infantry vehicles, and trucks.1

Belarus as a distracting menace

Return of Russian troops to Belarus in autumn (probably to accommodate and train new recruits) , coupled with continued military drills near Ukraine, compelled Ukraine to disperse its forces across its northern frontier and bolster its defensive capabilities in the region, even if the probability of another attack launched from Belarus remained low. Ukraine had established numerous defensive elements and engineering barriers, destroyed access roads, and reinforced military units in the area.

Belarus as an active part of nuclear extortion

Throughout the year, Putin frequently invoked the specter of nuclear escalation to deter Western nations from supplying Ukraine with advanced arms. He also hinted at equipping Belarus with nuclear warheads, later clarifying that Belarus would not have control over them. Lukashenko backed these moves, citing the need to counter an "aggressive" West. The pathway for nuclear weapon stationing in Belarus was paved when the country amended its Constitution on 27 February 2022, abandoning its non-nuclear stance.

No Belarusian troops in Ukraine

Despite its extensive support, Belarus did not dispatch troops to Ukraine. Given the Belarusian army's lack of combat experience, outdated training, and insufficient equipment. Its effect on the course of the war would hardly be decisive. On the other hand, the army’s participation in the war could jeopardize the internal stability of the Lukashenko regime.

Accelerated Military Integration with Russia

Although the Belarusian army remains formally under the control of Lukashenko, the nation has effectively been transformed into a Russian military training ground and a logistics hub. Pre-war trends pointing in this direction were cemented through various agreements.

Days before the Allied Resolve-2022 exercise and the subsequent invasion of Ukraine, the new Union State Military Doctrine—signed in November 2021—was disclosed. This doctrine emphasizes shared threat perceptions between the two countries, particularly the escalation of external security threats, and how these perceptions guide their joint military and defense planning.

In October 2022, the establishment of a “regional military grouping” was proclaimed, which would include both Belarusian and Russian troops stationed within Belarus. This pact essentially served to rationalize a subsequent wave of Russian troop deployments in Belarus. Although these deployments were notably smaller than those leading up to the February invasion, the estimated 6,000 – 9,000 Russian troops stationed in Belarus could potentially be utilized to control Belarusian territory or as an initial platform for a future assault on Ukraine from the north.

Furthermore, in December 2022, an amendment to the 1997 agreement on jointly ensuring regional security in the military domain was signed. Putin’s visit to Belarus that month—the first in over three years — was primarily aimed at fostering military cooperation and publicly reinforcing the commitment to forge a “joint defense space.” Both nations are now geared towards enhancing troop preparation and boosting combat readiness, including through an increase in joint exercises.

A subsequent agreement2 focusing on cooperation in the military-tech domain was signed in September 2022 and ratified in May 2023. This pact put into action a program that promotes research, standardization, industrial collaboration, and joint initiatives benefiting third-party countries.

Additionally, Belarus and Russia consented to extend the free use of two military facilities in Baranovichi and Vileika for an additional 25 years.

These strategic moves imply that Russia harbors long-term intentions to intertwine the Belarusian military with its own military-industrial complex. Given this intimate alignment in standards, procedures, training, and production capabilities, it would be challenging for the Belarusian military to detach itself from its deepening integration with Russian frameworks or to swiftly adapt to Western standards, even if Belarus undergoes a sudden regime change. Furthermore, this close integration is likely to cultivate loyalty towards Russia within the Belarusian military, putting Lukashenko in a competition with the Kremlin over their loyalty. This dynamic reduces the probability that the military and security sectors would shift their allegiance to democratic entities should another wave of civil unrest erupt in Belarus.

Although Lukashenko cannot afford to publicly declare it, subjecting the country’s military-strategic potential (including its territory) to the needs of the Russian army is not fully in line with his own desire to remain in power. At the moment, the goodwill of the Kremlin is all he can rely on.

Priorities: Modernize the Belarusian Military and Enhance Domestic Defense and Security

The Belarusian regime has likely made a serious assessment of the potential for the war to spill over into Belarusian territory. Ukraine has sufficient technical capabilities to defeat targets in the interior of Belarus. And in Minsk they might lack confidence that Kyiv would always avoid retaliation, under any circumstances.Also, Lukashenko's probable concern that Belarusian volunteers assisting the Ukrainian army could eventually set their sights on Minsk.

Belarusian democratic forces estimate3 that approximately 1,500 Belarusian volunteers are fighting in Ukraine, although the precise figure is hard to confirm and remains undisclosed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. These groups have consistently expressed their intent to topple Lukashenko after achieving victory in Ukraine.

Given the Belarusian army's current limitations, it is ill-equipped to either engage in external conflicts or robustly defend national territory. Thus, military reform took center stage in 2022.

That year saw the Belarusian army engaging in surprise combat readiness checks4 and efforts to update its equipment. There have also been attempts to modernize its equipment. Lukashenko notably sought the modernization of Su-25 fighter jets at Russian facilities, aiming to equip them for nuclear capability. Later, Belarusian pilots commenced training on these upgraded jets.

Sanctions restricted Belarus' ability to procure military equipment, solidifying Russia as its primary supplier. Notably, 2022 witnessed the delivery of S400 and Iskander missile systems to Belarus (it is unclear whether Minsk paid for them, and if so - how).

A key focus for the Belarusian authorities has been the potential mobilization of additional soldiers. Several waves of mobilization in the country raised concerns about whether Belarus was preparing to send troops to Ukraine. Despite these concerns, 2022 mobilization events largely conformed to standard conscript recruitment. However, the swift and unexpected rounds of readiness checks for the reserves highlighted preparations for a potential wartime transition. The exercises were organized uncharacteristically quickly and without advance notice of their duration.

Emphasis on updating reserve and recruit lists suggests preparation for a full-scale mobilization if one is ever required. Throughout Belarus, territorial defense forces underwent readiness assessments. Lukashenko's longstanding vision of territorial defense saw further progression with his order to establish a "people's militia." Yet, the actualization of this initiative remains nebulous, lacking clear direction or structure.

Military-industrial Complex: sent into overdrive

Ukraine’s use of western satellites for communications and intelligence gathering had forced Russia to accelerate the development of its own satellite systems. The Belarusian defense industry has been tailored to support the Russian military's needs. Lukashenko confirmed that the military integration package, which Belarus fully implemented in 2022, included defense industrial projects. These projects covered the production of semiconductors (a heavily sanctioned vital component for modern weapons), trucks, and aviation components.

Belarus' expertise in microelectronics has been invaluable in this venture. Belarus possesses specialized capabilities, cultivated since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Efforts have been made since 2020 to foster joint ventures and initiatives to boost cooperation in the space sector.

Peleng, a Belarusian optoelectronics firm, has been pivotal in developing sight solutions for Russian armored vehicles and software for its missile systems. Belarusian companies Planar and Integral have become increasingly crucial in aiding Russia's efforts to compensate for its restricted access to Western microelectronic technologies.5 In return, Russia has agreed to co-finance the industry's development with Belarus.6

Minsk continued to supply specialized equipment, including wheel chassis, used in a number of Russian missile and launch systems. Demand for these products is anticipated to rise.

The prominence of drones (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) in the war in Ukraine has spotlighted Belarus' production capabilities in this domain. However, attempts to launch the production failed: the Belarusian models were not competitive enough in a combat setting and couldn’t attract significant buyers. This could change, given the ongoing interest and foundational work already in place, which includes collaborations with notable producers like Iran.

Official reports indicate that, despite Western sanctions, Belarus continued to export military products to 57 countries. Only 11 nations have dropped off the list in recent years.7

Cooperation with a number of these countries is likely to deepen further in order to meet growing defense needs and allow import substitution of Western components.

Heavily sanctioned, Belarusian economy will continue to seek new export opportunities. The Russian military, on the other hand, has few partners willing to provide essential military components and resources.

Further straining of relations with the West: Belarus as a regional source of instability

Belarus' participation in the war has entailed a legitimate response from Western countries - new sets of sanctions, including against the country’s defense sector, associated enterprises, and individuals.

Since the war's commencement, NATO countries have reevaluated their defense postures and bolstered the Alliance’s Eastern flank, which included stationing additional troops closer to the Belarusian and Russian borders. Should Russian troops establish a permanent presence in Belarus and if nuclear weapons are stationed there, NATO plans will be further strengthened.

Conclusion

Belarus' military integration with Russia has forged long-term dependencies that will prove challenging to disentangle. The enduring presence of Russian military forces, including nuclear weapons under Moscow’s control, severely constrains Belarus' sovereignty and its potential pathways to mend relations with Western nations. This situation also heightens Lukashenko's personal vulnerabilities.

Deployment of Russian nuclear weapons in Belarus has further tarnished his regime's image. Moreover, the presence of nuclear weapons in Belarus does not make its political regime stronger, since control over it is likely to remain with the Kremlin and will only serve as an additional justification for the continued Russian military presence in Belarus. Finally, in case of realization of the worst scenario - the use of nuclear weapons deployed in Belarus against Ukraine or other enemy. If Putin opts to deploy nuclear weapons against Ukraine or any other enemy from the territory of Belarus, such an action would designate the launch site as a legitimate retaliation target.

The security landscape of Belarus hinges on the way the Ukrainian war progresses. Absent a clear victory for either side, 2023 will probably witness the intensifying integration of Belarusian and Russian military and security forces.

That said, should Ukraine achieve notable successes, Lukashenko might explore escape routes from an unfavorable alliance. Even then, with Russia's established presence in Belarus, Lukashenko's ability to act independently will be substantially curtailed. Even if Russia retreats from parts of Ukraine, it doesn't mean a similar withdrawal from Belarus. The stability of Putin's regime, which will be influenced by the outcome in Ukraine, will be the determining factor in the matter.