Democratic Organizations: Clustering around Tsikhanouskaya

Zmicier Kuchliej

Summary

The coalition of political organizations led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya retained its leadership in the Belarusian democracy movement. The crisis within the movement was temporarily resolved once the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC) was established, which involved popular personalities. In Tsikhanouskaya’s cabinet, the security component was reinforced at the request of supporters of change. The protest movement turned anti-war following the Kremlin’s attack on Ukraine, with limited mobilization of the democracy core during Lukashenko’s plebiscite.

Discussions of possible ways to democratize Belarus — from forcing the ruling class to pursue a dialogue to a regime change resulting from a national liberation movement — were stepped up in political organizations. Criticism of the Tsikhanouskaya coalition was periodically amplified by attempts to restructure influence in favor of other political centers. However, neither the Forum of Democratic Forces headed by Valery Tsepkalo, nor the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment in cooperation with Zianon Pazniak was able to seize the initiative.

The party building process in Belarus gradually froze, although individual political organizations (the United Civic Party (UCP), the Belarusian Social Democratic Party (BSDP) (“Hramada”), the organizing committees of Viktar Babaryka’s “Together” (“Razam”) and Andrey Dmitriyeu’s “Our Party” (“Nasha Partiya”) held some events — including anti-war — for their sympathizers.

Trends:

Introduction

In conditions of authoritarian reactionary policy, political organizations sought to maintain their core membership, as well as engage political migrants in their activities. The Lukashenko regime increased the costs of sociopolitical activism, with repression targeting not only activists, but also dissidents. The impact of democratic forces on Belarus' domestic agenda progressively declined, in no small measure due to the elimination of independent media by protectors of the regime. Individual media outlets attempted to build an infrastructure abroad; however, notwithstanding all their efforts, they were unable to bring their respective audiences back to the level of 2020.

The proportion of state propaganda and Russian outlets in the country’s media environment expanded, which significantly narrowed the media capacity of political organizations. The democratic forces were mostly centered on an anti-war, international, repression and sanctions agenda, which the democratic core called for. Political organizations gradually focused their attention on the consolidation of supporters of the European choice.

The democratic forces saw their work with their audience inside Belarus blocked in every possible way by protectors of the regime, including through the demolition of the legal framework and hikes in costs of sociopolitical activism. The rhetoric of democratic organizations towards the Lukashenko regime became increasingly harsher in response to ongoing repression, complicity in the war in Ukraine, and gradual surrender of sovereignty to the Kremlin. Against the backdrop of the enhanced international isolation of the Lukashenko regime, political organizations intensified their engagement with Western leaders.

Lukashenko’s plebiscite: anti-war mobilization of society

Following lengthy discussions, the broad coalition of democratic forces led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya approved its general strategy to mobilize supporters of change and encourage them to spoil ballots at the constitutional referendum. The participants in the “Cross Out the Referendum” campaign successfully communicated their message to supporters of protests. About 73% of respondents in the “People’s Poll” (“Narodnae apytanne”) independent opinion poll said they were ready to support the Tsikhanouskaya coalition’s action strategy.1

Intensified reactionary practices, broadening repression and escalated persecution of dissenters formed the backdrop for the plebiscite. Votes were cast amid the beginning of the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine, which accounted for the anti-war nature of the civic mobilization.

Some political organizations — both registered parties and Viktar Babaryka’s team (the organizing committee of the “Together” party) — distanced themselves from the Tsikhanouskaya coalition for fear of repression. However, their approaches had a lot in common with the “Cross Out the Referendum” campaign. Zianon Pazniak, a 1990s opposition leader, was among the main critics of Tsikhanouskaya’s voting initiative and called for voters to ignore Lukashenko’s plebiscite.

The democratic forces were compelled to give up on large-scale monitoring due to possible repression. The opposition parties managed to nominate only a few dozen representatives to election commissions.

During the main polling day in Minsk, Hrodna, Mahilyou, Zodzina and some other cities, lines were formed near some polling stations. At Tsikhanouskaya’s appeal, protests focused on anti-war messages, and street rallies were staged in Minsk, albeit on a much smaller scale compared to 2020. Human rights activists reported detentions of over 900 demonstrators.2

Anti-war decentralized movement: initiative of the democratic forces

The democratic forces swiftly responded to the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine by initiating an anti-war movement that resonated with broad sections of the population. Political organizations managed to consolidate their positions in society during the first few weeks of Moscow’s aggression. At the start of the war, the audience of independent media grew as well, as the state propaganda increasingly got closer to the Kremlin’s narratives.

The position of the democratic forces was consistent with the anti-war sentiment in society, which paved the way for the recruitment of activists to participate in nonviolent protests (anti-war graffiti, leaflets, and acts of defiance) as well as sabotage on railroads and attacks on the state’s online infrastructure, especially in the first months of the war.

Public protests were scarce and were gradually phased out as a result of severe persecution. Нowever, Lukashenko’s forces were unable to put an end to the underground movement, which operated until the end of the year.

Militants from BYPOL, “Resistance” (“Supratiu”), and Cyber Partisans were actively involved in supporting the decentralized underground initiative to counter Russia’s aggression. According to BYPOL, up to 200,000 activists were engaged in the “Victory” (“Peramoha”) plan. The anti-war movement acquired the form of sabotage and wrecking of railroad facilities and cyber attacks on the infrastructure used to support Russian troops.

The underground guerrillas and cyber partisans carried out a few successful operations on the Belarusian railroad, which slowed the advance of Russian troops through Belarus toward Ukraine. The rail war was halted once most of the Russian weapons and military equipment had been withdrawn from the territory of Belarus.

In conjunction with crowdfunding initiatives and diasporas the democratic forces focused on providing support for refugees, to help Ukraine, including support of volunteers.

Foreign policy achievements: democratic forces vs. the regime

The democratic forces succeeded in preventing or partially lifting restrictive measures from the European countries' side toward Belarusian citizens due to the Lukashenko regime’s support for the Kremlin’s invasion of Ukraine. Political organizations focused their efforts on a mission to separate the Lukashenko regime from Belarusian society in the eyes of the international community.

Success in the international scene is attributable to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s vigorous activities. In 2021–2022, the leader of the democratic forces completed about 90 international visits and met with dozens of country leaders and top political figures.

The Tsikhanouskaya coalition attempted to imitate the diplomatic functions of the state now that the Lukashenko regime was in isolation, as well as amid the gradual withdrawal of civil and political rights from opponents of the ruling class.

Tsikhanouskaya’s Office and Cabinet, the National Anti-Crisis Management (NAM)3 led by Pavel Latushka, intensified communications with Western capitals with a view to promoting the isolation of the Lukashenko regime and organizing an international tribunal for complicity in Russia’s aggression, as well as with the purpose of maintaining support for civil society.

Tsikhanouskaya coalition: leadership in shaping the democracy agenda

The coalition of political organizations led by Tsikhanouskaya preserved its leading role in the democracy movement despite periodic challenges from alternative political entities. The democratic forces intensified their cooperation and coordination during Lukashenko’s plebiscite as part of the “Cross Out the Referendum” campaign. The core of the alliance was formed by Tsikhanouskaya’s Office, the Coordination Council, NAM, as well as “Voice” (“Holas”), “Honest People” (“Sumlienniya ludzi”), and ZUBR.

Tensions among democratic forces and criticism of the broad coalition led by Tsikhanouskaya gradually escalated after the February referendum as society began recovering from the shock caused by the Kremlin’s aggression in Ukraine. The crisis in the democratic community was defused in August by conducting the large-scale New Belarus conference and establishment of Tsikhanouskaya’s Cabinet with the inclusion of popular leaders of democratic organizations, as well as revision of decision-making procedures within the broad coalition.

Joining the United Transitional Cabinet (UTC) were such prominent media figures as NAM chief Pavel Latushka and former military commander Valery Sakhashchyk, as well as representatives of BYPOL. The leadership of the Tsikhanouskaya coalition reinforced its security component at the request of the democratic core. Some opposition leaders, including Zianon Pazniak and Valery Tsepkalo, refused to participate in the Conference and instead concentrated on their own political projects.

Tsikhanouskaya’s Cabinet enjoyed considerable credibility, but over time suffered reputational losses following a series of media scandals, first in connection with the Russian citizenship of Representative for Defense and National Security Sakhashchyk, and then due to the leave of Representative for Finance and Economy Tatsiana Zaretskaya. Another scandal that tarnished the Cabinet was associated with the safety of activists after an undercover agent of the Main Directorate for Combating Organized Crime and Corruption of the Interior Ministry was reported to have been working for the Black Book of Belarus initiative.

Little by little the Coordination Council was losing its influence in formulating the agenda for the democracy movement. However, after the New Belarus conference, the democratic forces initiated a new phase of reforms providing for the involvement of a broader representation of civil society in the Council’s operations.

In the first half of the year, the NAM, headed by Latushka, was coordinating activities within the broad Tsikhanouskaya coalition, but the political organization operated autonomously. The NAM drew the attention of harsh critics of Lukashenko and worked mostly on promoting sanctions policies, thus deepening the international isolation of the regime. After the New Belarus conference, NAM leader Latushka became Tsikhanouskaya’s deputy in the UTC.

The Tsikhanouskaya coalition made repeated attempts to establish closer ties with the Ukrainian leadership, but to little avail. Representatives of the Ukrainian establishment occasionally made contradictory statements on Belarus, which often caused mixed reactions among national democrats and disoriented activists of the anti-war movement.

Alternative political projects

Throughout 2022, those opposition activists who questioned Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s leadership were often overly critical of the Office and eventually the UTC.

In the first half of the year Valery Tsepkalo, one of the former 2020 presidential candidates, sought to capture leadership of the democracy movement and brought together some critics of Tsikhanouskaya within the Forum of Democratic Forces of Belarus initiative. However, his attempts to rearrange influence in the democracy movement and confrontational rhetoric had an opposite effect and affected the oppositionist’s rating among the democracy core.

The Forum failed to put in place its large-scale National Council project with online voting, which would otherwise have enabled it to seize the initiative in the democracy movement. Politicization of Belarusian society is currently on the decline, and the largest mobilization initiatives (Voice, Honest People, ZUBR, backyard initiatives, etc.) choose to align their activities within the framework of the Tsikhanouskaya coalition.

In the second half of 2022, volunteers from the Kastus Kalinouski Regiment, who voiced their political ambition,4 attempted to assume the role of an alternative pillar of the national-democratic movement. Belarusian militants in Ukraine stepped up their cooperation with Cyber Partisans and Zianon Pazniak. Despite considerable support for the fighters among advocates of change, civil society remained divided on their political statements. Nevertheless, the Kalinouski Regiment managed to shore up its standing in the media landscape and kept its distance from Tsikhanouskaya’s Cabinet.

The team of one of the highest-ranking politicians Viktar Babaryka was gradually losing its influence in the democracy movement, and the “Together” party project was suspended on account of repression. Dialogue with Lukashenko as an agenda issue was losing its influence, primarily because of the apparent reluctance of the ruling class to embark on such dialogue and its intention to completely depoliticize society.

Parties: internal migration

The development of party projects was suspended due to the adverse political situation and incessant repression, and so were efforts to organize constituent congresses of new parties (“Together”, “Our Party”). By the end of the year, operations of the registered parties and political organizations which criticized the regime moderately had been almost completely paralyzed.

Political parties were eager to distance themselves from the Tsikhanouskaya coalition’s initiatives for fear of a harsh response from the regime’s guards. Registered organizations shifted their focus to internal organizational and outreach activities for their sympathizers, and cautiously promoted their anti-war agenda.

Some leaders of political parties were persecuted and imprisoned, including chairman of the Belarusian Popular Front (BPF) Ryhor Kastusiou and leader of the United Civic Party (UCP) Mikalai Kazlou. “Our Party” leader Andrey Dmitriyeu, a former 2020 presidential candidate, was detained in early 2023. A significant number of political activists were forced to emigrate.

From time to time right-centrists resumed their cooperation. The UCP, Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD), and the “For Freedom” movement, in cooperation with Tsikhanouskaya, contributed to a tough resolution against the Lukashenko regime at the congress of the European People’s Party,5 the largest party association in the European Union.

The loyalist political projects initiated by Yury Voskresensky and former MP Hanna Kanapatskaya were nipped in the bud amid authoritarian reaction and crackdown on dissent, coercion of loyalty to the Lukashenko regime, and ideology-driven consolidation of the ruling class.

Conclusions

The coalition led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya continues to shape the agenda for the protest movement, including by exchanging regular feedback with the democratic core. On the other hand, the social base of the broad coalition is gradually boiling down to supporters of Belarus' pro-European choice. Political organizations focus on ultimatum and sanctions narratives that hardly strike a chord with the general public.

Meanwhile, the mobilization capacity of the democratic forces continues to narrow against the backdrop of persistent repression, migration of activists, and a shrinking audience of independent media. At the same time, high-profile unpopular acts by the ruling class, such as the decision to let the Kremlin deploy nuclear weapons in Belarus, create a window of opportunity for the democratic forces to mobilize society.

At the same time, the democratic forces appear to have an increasingly important role in forming the agenda of Western capitals on Belarus.

Political parties will be strengthening their coalition cooperation, especially if they happen to lose their official status. Some organizations will continue their activities via foreign representative offices. Some activists will operate within the renewed legal framework as affiliates of public associations, steering committees, or join other political projects with a suitable ideology if the current ruling class remains in power.