Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the Mass Consciousness of Belarusians

Henadz Korshunau

Summary

In 2020, Belarus witnessed a wave of protests and a horizontal revolution. 2021 marked a period of regime counter-revolution and an intensification of repressions. In 2022, the major shaping factor in the dynamics of mass consciousness of the nation was the next phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war, which commenced on 24 February 2022. This included the invasion of Ukraine by Russian forces from Belarusian territory. This outbreak of hostilities profoundly shocked the Belarusian society and triggered several shifts in the mass consciousness of Belarusians, impacting certain long-standing beliefs.

Trends:

Automatic anti-war consensus

"As long as there is no war!" This sentiment stands as a foundational pillar in the cultural narrative of Belarus' contemporary history. It is a recurring theme echoed in the recollections of the older generation, the Belarusian literature from the latter half of the twentieth century, and even in the rhetoric of Aleksandr Lukashenko. This sentiment became the foundation of the Belarusians' perspective on what Russia termed a "special military operation" and what Ukraine labeled the next phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war.

Even before February 24, 2022, it was evident that an overwhelming majority of Belarusians would disapprove of a military aggression on Ukrainian soil. Both indirect data and specific queries in sociological studies supported this notion. For instance, a survey conducted by Chatham House just prior to the war's onset (January-February 2022)1 revealed that a mere 12-13% of respondents endorsed the hypothetical notion of backing the Kremlin in its conflict with Ukraine. Additionally, as of the end of 2021, the primary concern among Belarusians was the anxiety surrounding the anticipated resurgence of hostilities in Ukraine, as indicated by the Belarusian Analytical Workshop (BAW).2

Against this backdrop, it was hardly surprising that the onset of the next phase of the Russo-Ukrainian war saw an overwhelming anti-war sentiment resonate throughout Belarusian society. Results from various publicly available sociological studies consistently demonstrate that fewer than 10% of respondents supported Belarus' engagement in the conflict on Russia's side. This stance towards the Ukrainian conflict solidified almost instantly and remained consistent throughout the year, irrespective of the evolving dynamics on the battlefield.

Belarusians' consensus regarding the potential establishment of Russian military bases or the placement of nuclear weapons within Belarus has remained unchanged. Various studies indicate that, at least during the early months of the hostilities, the share of respondents in favor of deploying military bases hovered at around 25%, while support for nuclear weapons stood at 8-9%. It's worth mentioning that an additional 10-14% of respondents were somewhat amenable to the idea of situating Russian nuclear armaments on Belarusian soil.

The Desire for Peace and Calm

The beginning of the new phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war came as a shock to Belarusian society. Typically, in such situations, the "rally around the flag" phenomenon can be observed. The term refers to society uniting around its political leader, resulting in increased trust in them in times of a major threat.

At first, one might assume that this effect was observed in Belarus as well. Data from the Belarusian Tracker of Change indicates a 10% surge in trust in the authorities following the initiation of hostilities in Ukraine. After a period of stability during the summer, a second wave of increased trust emerged in the fall (rising by 6%) and continued into the winter of 2022-23 (rising by 5%). This can likely be attributed to the differences in approach to the conflict when compared to Russia. The Belarusian authorities:

It's evident that the aforementioned points are in many ways manipulative and propagandistic, influencing a portion of the society. Consequently, over half of the urban population believes that Belarus is not involved in the Russo-Ukrainian war and doesn't act as a co-aggressor (though, by international standards, it very much does).

Interestingly, in this scenario, the regime's propaganda couldn't entirely dominate public sentiment. We witness a non-conventional form of unity, which sociologist Andrei Vardamatski has termed as "consolidation without a flag." This implies that the anti-war consensus which emerged in Belarus did so independently, without a guiding political figurehead. Existing studies3 indicate that the base of support for the Lukashenko regime hasn't grown over the past year. With respect to the urban demographic, it has remained static, hovering around 20-25%.4

Consequently, the rise in trust towards state entities shouldn't be perceived as growing trust in Aleksandr Lukashenko's governance. Rather, it seems more apt to interpret it as an approval of Belarus' decision to refrain from active participation in the war. Sociologist Philip Bikanau perceives this trend as the emergence and fortification of a "desire for calm."5

Declining popularity of geopolitical neutrality

The Russo-Ukrainian war has also impacted the foreign policy neutrality stance traditionally held in Belarusian mass consciousness. The concept of geopolitical neutrality gained prominence by the late 2000s and, until recently, was widely embraced by most Belarusians. In the early 2010s, its proponents constituted between 50 and 55% of the population. Following the revolutionary year of 2020, this figure rose even further, reaching almost two-thirds of Belarusian society (63-64%).

While the notion of neutrality began losing its supporters in 2021, about half of the population still subscribed to it. Essentially, these were the champions of "active" neutrality — individuals who believed Belarus could serve as a bridge between the East and the West while fostering close ties with both the European Union and Russia. However, 2022 exposed the impossibility of such a stance.

With the onset of the Ukrainian conflict, societal support for neutrality dipped below 50% (March - 47%, June - 46%, November - 43%).6 This decline occurred predominantly at the expense of "active" neutrality advocates, their numbers waning by over a third. Interestingly enough, the percentage of those favoring complete non-alignment saw a modest increase, from 20% to 23%.7

This drift away from the neutrality camp predominantly veered "eastward." Following the onset of the war, those advocating for a Belarusian alliance with the Russian Federation saw an 8% increase, moving from 29% in November 2021 to 37% in the first quarter of 2022. Concurrently, the faction endorsing Belarus' accession to the European Union grew by a third, from 12% to 16%.

The remainder of 2022 saw only marginal fluctuations in these percentages. The proponents of unionizing with Russia hovered around 37-38%, while those endorsing simultaneous alignment with both the European Union and Russia fluctuated around 24-25%. Conversely, the portion of the population supporting passive neutrality waned from 23% to 18%, and the share of the advocates for European integration increased to 18%.

Although the war initially jolted Belarusian society, its progression and associated catastrophic events scarcely influenced the geopolitical leanings of Belarusians, save for a slight dent in confidence towards the imperative of neutrality. This observation is further corroborated by the relatively stable sentiments Belarusians hold towards Russia. After a dip below 80% in 2021-2022, the fraction of those holding a favorable view of their Eastern neighbor has stabilized around 71-73%.8

Shrinking horizontal ties and increasing diaspora activity

The Belarusian Revolution of 2020 was characterized by the explosive growth of horizontal ties, which the authorities rightly perceived as a threat and attempted to counteract. The initial repressions against activists from horizontal communities were observed as early as 2020. By 2021, there was a clear shift towards the communities’ complete eradication. The onset of the war in Ukraine in 2022 only amplified this trajectory.

With that said, horizontal ties could not be completely eliminated. Research9 conducted by the Center of New Ideas and the "People’s Poll" initiative suggests that while horizontal relations did "narrow", they persisted at foundational levels, such as the "circle of acquaintances" (having like-minded people) and the "circle of communication" (regular interactions). Furthermore, there was a noticeable transition from online interactions with like-minded individuals to more offline communications.

Discussing the online format of horizontal ties, the protest segment of the Belarusian society continues to demonstrate a high level of participation in online communities. Lower-income individuals, older age groups, and activists from small towns (including villages and district centers) have begun connecting to these online platforms. In the current climate, communities that revolve around non-profit organizations spanning various sectors, as well as independent projects or initiatives, are sought after the most. Overall, horizontal ties are becoming less politicized and are shifting towards more civic-oriented activities.10

Amidst the ongoing domestic repressions, the endeavors of Belarusians who moved abroad and became part of the Belarusian diaspora have gained significant relevance. Precise data on post-2020 migration rates is currently unavailable, but it is safe to say that it represents the largest migration wave in Belarus' recent history, which could potentially influence the country's social dynamics.

Research indicates that Belarusians who remain in the country hold the expectation that the diaspora will act as a representative voice for the Belarusian society, standing in opposition to the Lukashenko regime.11 Indeed, the diaspora is well-positioned to fulfill this role.

A typical profile of an active Belarusian abroad could be described as follows: likely a 35-year-old male with a higher education, employed in the private sector, and earning a relatively high income. Such an individual maintains strong ties to their home country and actively keeps abreast of events unfolding in Belarus.

It's worth noting that horizontal ties within the Belarusian diaspora are notably tight-knit. What sets them apart is their cross-border nature; the majority of active Belarusians abroad predominantly interact with fellow Belarusians globally. Simultaneously, a significant portion of the active Belarusian diaspora engages in various social and civic activities, including pro-Belarusian and anti-war advocacy.

Conclusion

The development of the situation in Belarus and its reflection in mass consciousness will be significantly influenced by the progression of military actions in Ukraine. Other factors include the extent of Belarus' involvement in the conflict and the reactions of neighboring countries (as well as the broader international community) to that involvement or lack thereof. Generally speaking, if Ukraine prevails, there might be a resurgence in protest dynamics, especially with active support from the diaspora. If the war becomes protracted, the double occupation of Belarus will intensify, and the regime pressure on the society will increase. Regardless of the outcome, society's rejection of the war and the Lukashenko regime is likely to persist.