President’s Administration: Seeking a New Format for the Political System

Nikolai Burov

Summary

Throughout 2022, the Presidential Administration (PA) created a new configuration of the political system, which would provide guarantees to the incumbent regime, win over those on the fence, and completely isolate any opponents of the ruling regime from the political process. This strategy took roots in the latest version of the Constitution, and was further nourished by the development of a pro-government civil society under the PA’s supervision, including through the development of a party system.

By early 2023, the general framework of the prospective political system had been put in place However, the concurrent parallel escalation of repression made it impossible to speak of any genuine resumption of the political dynamics in the country.

Trends:

Outlining the new political landscape

Throughout 2022, the Presidential Administration (PA) focused on building a new political system to align with the realities of a post-August 2020 Belarus: Lukashenko’s low approval ratings, the delegitimization of the principal state institutions, the exodus of a significant portion of the populace abroad, the persistence of widespread repression and escalating societal rifts, a growing dependence on Russia,economic challenges, and endorsement of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

For the political system created by the AP to be considered successful, it must satisfy at least two principal conditions: (1) ensure the perpetuation of Aleksandr Lukashenko’s personal authority, potentially paving the way for a succession by one of his sons, and (2) curtail the risk of election upheavals, even if it means eschewing direct elections or mass electoral movements. The key milestones within this restructuring of the Belarusian political system include adopting the revamped constitution and the set of laws on the AllBelarusian People's Assembly, systematically disenfranchising civil society, and revising strategies for party establishment.

However, the realization of these goals was hampered by Lukashenko’s apparent vacillation on key issues of the new political arrangement: the roles and composition of the All-Belarusian People's Assembly (ABPA), the modalities of the presidential elections, the distribution of powers between the President and the head of the ABPA, and the envisioned roles of state-sanctioned parties and quasi-social organizations (often referred to as GoNGOs) within this new structure.

Turning the page, but not quite there yet

The endeavors of the Presidential Administration (PA) to resolve the political crisis of 2020 were significantly hindered by the tangible shift in the balance of power from the civil administration towards the security bloc. The latter’s influence was further strengthened in the context of the Russo-Ukrainian war. Repressive measures intensified throughout 2022, thereby undermining the administration's occasional efforts to « turn the page» and move beyond the crisis, the security forces’ stance and actions often stymieing progress.

A case in point was the proposed amnesty aligned with National Unity Day on September 17th. Despite active discussions regarding the potential release of a significant number of political prisoners - and even lists of potential amnesties prepared by Yury Voskresensky, a figure from the so-called “pro-government opposition”, the amnesty did not extend to these individuals. Moreover, Olga Chupris, PA Deputy Head who supervised the preparation of the amnesty, advocated not just for curtailing the scope of the amnesty, but also for the revocation of citizenship for political emigrants.

A similar dynamic was evident in the relationship between the state and the business community. On January 28, during the annual address to the people and parliament, Lukashenko supported the proposal of Andrey Kopytka - the head of the «Republican Confederation of Entrepreneurship» - to hold a meeting with business leaders and entrusted the PA with the task. Yet, as the year unfolded, the meeting was never organized. The rationale was apparent: there was no constructive dialogue to be had, and entrepreneurs were largely perceived as a politically hostile social group.

A partially satisfactory referendum

The Presidential Administration (PA) perceived the adoption of the new version of the Constitution as an opportunity to return, at least symbolically, to some imitation of the electoral process. However, judging from Igor Sergeenko’s speech at the country’s Security Council meeting on February 8, it was evident that the authorities had security concerns about the referendum and doubts about its ultimate feasibility. This became especially clear on February 27, when polling stations became mustering points for protesters, though the dissent was not in relation to the constitutional amendments, but was rather a reaction to Russia's invasion of Ukraine three days earlier. While the referendum did take place and seemed to align with the authorities’ objectives (with over half of the participants supposedly voting early), Lukashenko’s fear of participating in electoral campaigns remained. Throughout the year, he frequently expressed regret that the presidential role wasn’t exempt from direct public elections.

Party of power

With the adoption of the new constitution, the process of establishing the party of power accelerated. There has been a longstanding demand within the bureaucracy for a robust party-centric system. . Surprisingly, Lukashenko himself had been the main opponent of this idea. His deviation from the long-standing practice of verbal engagement without substantial action symbolizes a profound political crisis at the top of the government.

On April 15, Lukashenko met with the head of PA Igor Sergeenko, and the chairman of the republican association «Belaya Rus» Oleg Romanov. On April 21, Lukashenko discussed the issue of party building and legal formalization of the new political system with the Justice Minister Sergey Khomenko and Deputy Head of PA Olga Chupris.

Yet in June, during a seminar «Updating methods and forms of work with the population at the local level», Lukashenko asserted that while party development was impending, it was not a universal remedy. . He underscored the importance of fostering an «appropriate» civil society and enacting corresponding legislation. He continued to express his skepticism about party building, believing that in this matter «there is absolutely no need to rush». Lukashenko’s hesitancy about the rapidly establishing party of power was evident, with concerns about societal discord, even at the December 13 meeting, a few months before «Belaya Rus» was transformed into a political party.

Community Outreach: Media Cleanup and SimulatedDialogue with GoNGO

Assessing the efficacy of Igor Lutrky’s endeavors to dominate the information landscape is challenging. Throughout 2022, repression of independent media continued, with many outlets branded as «extremists» and several journalists detained. «Belarus Change Tracker» noted the «obvious intensification of repression against media, journalists and opinion leaders».1 According to the results of the May meeting on information policy, the head of PA, Igor Sergeenko, characterized the situation as an «information war».

In March, Lukashenko signed Decree 131 «On the Development of Mass Media», which introduced a separate fee for advertisers to support state media. The efficacy of this decree in enhancing public trust in state narratives remains ambiguous.

The strengthening of ideological-propagandist initiatives primarily flowed through GoNGO («State-organized non-governmental organizations»). Security agencies were deeply involved in supervising various military-patriotic clubs. The onus of amplifying the influence of youth organizations like BRSM fell upon the PA.

During the June the republican seminar «Actualization of methods and forms of work with the population at the local level», officials voiced concerns about GoNGOs («Belaya Rus», BRSM, veterans' organizations, trade unions, etc.) inability to gauge societal sentiments. Yet, they simultaneously reiterated that the «society should be purged from rogue elements».

The purported «dialogue platforms», lauded for their effectiveness, were showcased as ideal interaction models. These «venues» were organized en masse following the events of August 2020 at the PA’s initiative as a sign of the authorities' readiness to have a dialogue with protesters. However, these were largely one-sided conversations dominated by officials and pro-government activists. One of the incidents that illustrates this fact took place in February when teachers at the Rechitsky district gymnasium received a prank-letter demanding to organize a «dialogue platform» at their institution. The completion report was sent just three hours after the letter requesting to organize the event was received.2

At the meeting on August 30, the authorities identified specific pillars of the Belarusian civil society, including the Communist Party, the BRSM, the Belarusian Union of Women, the Veterans' Association, the Pioneers, and the trade unions. The roster of potential ABPA participants incorporated all the aforementioned organizations, excluding the Pioneers, but did highlight «Belaya Rus», which is a political party now. Notably, the LDPB was overlooked once more.

From personnel purges to serfdom

In 2022, it became increasingly difficult for the PA to manage its personnel policy. Lukashenko’s statements on October 3, during the appointment of the heads of district executive committees and other officials, served as the clearest indication of the human resource scarcity. 3 Lukashenko instructed Igor Sergeenko, in collaboration with Prime Minister Roman Golovchenko and local government leaders to streamline personnel operations and to set rules for the staff movement of civil servants at the level of regional executive committees by January 1, 2023.

Lukashenko emphasized three times that they shouldn’t resort to «serfdom», yet, paradoxically, he seemed to advocate for it. He referred to the resignation of civil servants of their own volition and their subsequent employment in the private sector - a legal right in a free labor market - as a «humpty-dumpty turnover». The «iron order» he demanded appears to be a ban on the transfer of civil servants (and possibly other state organization employees) without the approval of the chairman of the executive committee. To date, no regulation containing these provisions, which blatantly contradict labor law, has been made public.

Personnel purges continued to target employees perceived or suspected of disloyalty. Individuals convicted on political charges, or those suspected of disloyalty to the regime for other reasons, faced employment restrictions.

Following February, the effect of Russia's invasion of Ukraine became evident. On March 15, in a meeting with security forces (which also included I. Sergeenko) Lukashenko claimed that under the aegis of the special services of the United States and Western Europe in Vilnius, Warsaw and Kyiv, a “new elite” was being trained for Belarus, similar to the Abwehr schools during the Great Patriotic War era.This new elite is allegedly being prepared to infiltrate state administration bodies, security agencies, public organizations, and mass media.4

In August, the PA was tasked with a comprehensive review of the roster to identify underperformers. However, the outcomes of the subsequent purges were not disclosed to the public.

The challenge for the PA lies in sourcing loyal and «patriotic» personnel, especially when surrounded by perceived “enemies”. The influence of the power bloc increases significantly, and the candidate pool diminishes. Furthermore, even though she no longer serves within the PA, Natalia Kochanova continues to exert a significant influence on personnel policies.

Russification of history policies

On January 6, at a meeting on the implementation of history policy, Lukashenko characterized the establishment of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth on the territory of modern day Belarus as the Polish occupation of Belarusian lands and the ethnocide of the Belarusian people. The PA was mandated with developing a concept of historical policy. The «correct views» on the historic issue held by Vadim Gigin, the head of the «Knowledge» Society, the rector of the Management Academy Vyacheslav Danilovich, and MP Igor Marzalyuk, deserved special praise.

In February 2022, Lukashenko signed a decree on the establishment of the Council for History Policy under the presidential administration, led by I. Sergeenko.5 Sergeenko was also responsible for selecting the board members. Central to their agenda was the revision of the teaching of social and humanitarian disciplines, as well as the intensification of ideological-propaganda work under the guise of patriotic education.

The events of 2020 prompted the authorities to pay closer, albeit selective, attention to the topic of historical memory. Simultaneously, the PA focuses primarily on one aspect - discrediting Lukashenko opponents, including EU countries, by associating them with the Nazis responsible for what the official narrative describes as the «genocide of the Belarusian people».6 The proponents of this new narrative are not at all confused by the fact that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States fought against Nazi Germany, not to mention the countries in Europe that were occupied by the Nazis.

Central to the formation of this revised historical memory is the tragedy of Khatyn, which, authorities’ perspective, serves as an effective tool to promote anti-Western, anti-opposition, and potentially anti-Ukrainian narratives. Lukashenko granted the «Khatyn» memorial complex a significant upgrade, dubbing its repair and reconstruction as the «All-Belarus youth construction».7

Collectively, these efforts align the Belarusian historical narrative more closely with the Russian perspective on the history of Eastern Europe.

Conclusion

Throughout the year, the PA has consistently pursued an agenda of reshaping the country’s political system. The transformation had several distinct objectives: bolstering the legitimacy of Lukashenko and fortifying societal support of the regime in general returning to semblances of public political processes (including electoral campaigns), refining existing power preservation mechanisms, and creating new ones amidst escalating social divisions, a deteriorating economic landscape, and heightened regional security tensions. Though some of these challenges had been, in part, addressed, the ongoing repression and the overall decline in Belarus' political autonomy rendered many efforts much less effective. The term «simulacrum» aptly captures the essence of many elements of the newly configured political landscape in Belarus.

In 2023, the PA’s primary focus will pivot towards preparations for the electoral campaign slated for February 2024. It seems implausible that a pro-government party system will be fully operational by then. Nonetheless, semblances of activity in this area will provide the PA with tactical flexibility both domestically and, crucially, in dialogues with Russia and the West. A potential pitfall that could undermine these endeavors is the escalating involvement of Belarus in the Russo-Ukrainian war.