Presidential Administration: Delegation of powers to the Security Council

Nikolai Burov

Summary

The trends in the Presidential Administration, which we wrote about in the previous Yearbook,1 continued in 2020. The most important political task set to the Administration was to ensure a smooth re-election of Alexander Lukashenko for a new term. The Administration apparently failed, as the country was driven into a severe crisis. The ideological narrative chosen for the presidential election did not work, and the acutest problems in domestic policies remained unresolved. As a result, a significant part of the Administration’s powers in political decision-making, staffing and information policy were de facto transferred to the Security Council and security and defense agencies.

Trends:

Securing the presidential election

The year 2020 can be considered one of the most difficult periods for the Administration, which played the role of Alexander Lukashenko’s political headquarters. That was connected with the preparation for the presidential election, designing a COVID-19 response strategy, and, most importantly, looking for ways out of the political crisis, which sharply escalated after the events of August 9–12.

The Presidential Administration entered 2020 with some optimism, considering that the November 2019 parliamentary elections followed the usual scenario, despite some red flags that many political analysts and the Administration itself pointed at. In essence, the parliamentary elections were a kind of a rehearsal of the presidential campaign.

The Administration was aware of the opinion polls that showed that Lukashenko’s rating was quite low. There were no strong contenders in sight, which was comforting to some extent. Besides, the rating of the incumbent president could still be inflated in the few months left before the election by presenting Lukashenko

  1. as a leader who defeated the coronavirus without imposing severe restrictions;
  2. as a leader who successfully equivocates, collaborating with both Russia and the West. In the course of the election campaign, an agreement was signed to liberalize visa regulations with the European Union and to reduce the Schengen visa price for Belarusians to EUR 35. Also, a U. S. ambassador was expected to arrive shortly, while anti-Russian propaganda was in full swing, positioning Lukashenko as the sole guarantor of Belarus’ sovereignty;
  3. as a leader who ensured Belarus’ technological development by launching the nuclear power plant, opening new subway stations in Minsk, etc.

This strategy turned out to be a failure.

First, the experience of Japan, South Korea and Singapore2 was eagerly cited, but transformations of this kind require professionalism, which Belarusian state administrators apparently are lacking, so the chosen strategy turned into a mocking farce that, to all appearances, considerably shook the paternalistic sentiment in society.

Second, benefits of the rapprochement with the European Union, especially the relaxation of the visa regulations, could not be enjoyed since the pandemic shut the borders. The rejection of further integration with Russia and intensification of the anti-Russian rhetoric resulted in the use of long-established political technologies against Lukashenko by the Kremlin. Given the de-professionalization of political analysts in Belarus (represented by such ‘stalwarts’ as A. Shpakovsky, A. Avdonin, A. Lazutkin and others3) they proved quite effective.

Third, important infrastructure projects, including the third line of the Minsk subway and the Belarusian NPP, were not commissioned before the presidential election, which, in many respects, was a result of de-professionalization of Belarusian engineers and technicians.

In the meantime, the Presidential Administration was preparing a brutal solution to the problem of Lukashenko’s low rating. The question, the exact answer to which can only be received under a new central leadership, is at what point it was decided to apply force as the only effective response to the protests, and to forget about an “elegant” victory in the election?

During his election campaign, Lukashenko preferred visiting military units. On July 16, he went to the 103rd airborne brigade, where he met with Special Operations Troops Commander Vadim Denisenko; on June 24 – to the 5th Special Operations Brigade stationed in Maryina Gorka where he met with Denisenko again; on July 28 – to unit #3214 of the Interior Ministry’s Troops in Minsk.

Analyst Andrei Porotnikov believes that the Security Council secretly decided on the crackdown on protesters after Ivan Tertel was appointed chairman of the State Control Committee (SCC), which automatically made him a member of the Security Council, and one of the persons responsible for the repression.4 Ivan Tertel was appointed to the SCC on June 4, so the authorities, apparently, envisaged a violent scenario as early as May or even earlier.

At the meeting on amnesty held on April 16 (Olga Chupris in charge), it was suggested to release about two thousand persons with a demonstrable justification: to make room in detention facilities and penitentiaries. We can only guess whether this was dictated by the expectation of mass arrests in August.

Lukashenko’s statement made on March 27 during his visit to BelGips JSC is worth noting. Speaking about the possibility to identify those who contracted the coronavirus and their contacts, he said, “We are monitoring all those arriving at the airports and crossing the border. If we find even one such person, we immediately apply the police, the KGB and video surveillance cameras to find out with whom the person was in contact.”5 A little later, video surveillance was used to track and identify protesters. Given that the arrangement of the cameras takes time and money, and that the pandemic did not begin until late 2019, obviously, the authorities were preparing for something other than to identify infection bearers.

The transfer of Igor Sergeyenko from the position of first deputy chairman of the KGB to the office of presidential chief of staff in December 2019 was one of the indicators of the preparation for a crackdown during and after the presidential election.

It is likely that in the spring of 2020, the authorities were ready to combine two scenarios: a carrot for the loyal and a stick for the protesters. It was assumed that nothing would change in comparison with 2010, i.e. protest actions would be quickly and easily dispersed following the preemptive neutralization of significant socio-political activists and disorganization of the protesters.

So, the stake was finally placed in April-May 2020 on the violent scenario in the face of the rising negative public sentiment against the incumbent authorities and the failure of the plan to inflate Lukashenko’s rating. The detention of Sergei Tikhanovsky on May 29 can be viewed as an indicator of this change. It was done unprofessionally. Lukashenko even announced the incident a few days before it happened, and an easily identifiable prostitute was brought from Minsk to put up a fight. However, the law enforcers, probably, did not see it coming, and the decision was most likely made under the final election scenario.

Personnel changes

A certain cutback in the powers of Chief of Staff Igor Sergeyenko was an important trend in personnel policy of early 2020. Officially he was vested all the powers assigned to his office, but, de facto, his involvement in making personnel decisions, which is one of the most important functions of the Administration, was considerably limited until August 2020. Personnel decisions were largely influenced by Natalia Kochanova, former presidential chief of staff, now speaker of the Council of the Republic (the upper chamber of the parliament), although, formally, this is not in her job description.

After the events of August 9-12, judging by circumstantial evidence and some personnel decisions, Sergeyenko managed to take this important function back from Kochanova,6 as he became in charge of “turning the page.” However, a coronavirus infection hit him hard, so he had to take a break in the height of the political crisis. Kochanova regained her position by November, and even presented herself as one of the key figures who ensured normalization of the political situation, albeit seeming.

The sharply increased role of the Security Council and security services both in political decision-making and in the shaping of personnel and information policy was a more significant change, though.

Before and after the election, there were numerous appointments of security and law enforcement officials as regional watchdogs. In April, Andrei Ravkov, then state secretary of the Security Council, was appointed authorized representative of the head of state in the Brest Region. In July, Ivan Tertel was appointed authorized representative to the Vitebsk Region. On October 29, former KGB head Valery Vakulchik was appointed presidential assistant, inspector of the Brest Region. Former Interior Minister Yuri Karayev was appointed inspector of the Grodno Region, and his deputy Alexander Barsukov became inspector of the Minsk Region.

Their functions are not strictly defined, which raised questions in the expert community about their appointments. Previously, presidential assistants/inspectors failed to compete with governors in terms of powers assigned. For instance, former assistant/inspector of the Brest Region Anatoly Markevich, who had to urgently vacate his office for Vakulchik, accidentally became minister of culture. The most alarmist forecasts that the generals would actually replace the governors did not come true, but the strengthening of security officers at all levels of the presidential vertical is beyond dispute.

Among other appointments, the one of agriculture economist Valery Belsky, an advocate of firm state supervision, as deputy presidential chief of staff for lending and finances should be pointed at. Experts saw it as the strengthening of those in favor of greater administrative intervention in the economy.

“Turning the page”7

The second important function of the Administration, which Sergeyenko is unable to fully supervise, was the informational and ideological component that was controlled by Lukashenko’s Press Secretary Natalia Eismont (formally, her staff and herself are part of the Administration) and, again, Natalia Kochanova. As mentioned above, state propaganda failed to inflate Lukashenko’s rating before the election. On the contrary, some efforts of propagandists led to opposite (negative) results for the incumbent authorities, especially when it came to the official coverage of COVID-19 response measures.

At the meeting with the economic bloc held on July 23, Lukashenko expressed his dissatisfaction with the Administration and Kochanova’s performance during the information campaign. In April 2021, Deputy Chief of Staff Andrei Kuntsevich was replaced by propaganda hardliner, ex-Minister of Information Igor Lutsky.

The failure of state information policy peaked on August 9–12. When shutting down the Internet, the authorities were confident that information about the crackdown on protesters would not become public, but it did. Reports of violence catalyzed the protest sentiment in society, finally destroying what had left of Lukashenko’s positive image. The Presidential Administration proved unable to promptly react to the change, and the authorities had to turn to Russia for help.

Following the August 9–12 events, state propagandists synchronized their narrative with the Russian propaganda, and the Administration’s capacity to contribute to the shaping of the information agenda reduced. Belarusian propaganda had not been truly professional before. After a number of employees resigned, those who stayed were a sorry sight. The writings published by Grigory Azarenok, Alexei Golikov, Alexander Shpakovsky and others, who consider themselves journalists and political analysts, showed that they know nothing about journalism or political analysis, but also about conducting a more or less effective propaganda campaign.

Furthermore, the attempts to whitewash Lukashenko and recover his image of a “people’s president”, including through updated coverage of anti-COVID-19 efforts (Lukashenko’s numerous visits to hospitals in autumn 2020), did not produce tangible results. A rally in support of Lukashenko held on August 16 under Sergeyenko’s personal supervision was the first step towards “turning the page.” The initiative was then overtaken by Kochanova and Eismont, who basically control the information agenda now.

It became clear by the end of the autumn that the authorities were failing to assemble a representative pro-government rally. The emphasis mostly shifted onto the defamation of the opponents of the regime and justification of mass repression. The fight against the white-red-white flag and the labeling of the protesters as “fascist thugs” is an important part of this campaign. The goal is to justify the violence applied in the summer and autumn of 2020 by demonizing the opponents of the regime. However, the authorities proved unable to generate a positive information agenda in 2020.

Conclusion

In 2020, the Presidential Administration did not manage to ensure a smooth reelection of Lukashenko, and engaged in the preparation for the brutal scenario. Efforts were made to create an information vacuum and neutralize protest activists, the number of whom was estimated at around 2,000. Both jobs were done poorly. In many respects, the Administration contributed to the escalation of the political crisis, as a result of which the heft of the Security Council and the law enforcement agencies increased considerably, while the Administration’s capacity to make political, personnel and information decisions significantly declined.