Democratic Organizations: Fragmented, but with a single agenda

Dmitry Kukhley

Summary

In 2020, political organizations faced two contradictory challenges that defined their future. On the one hand, the August 2020 presidential election and politicization of society helped draw public attention to the parties and party nominees, increased their role with respect to the national agenda, and attracted new activists. On the other hand, the legal default and post-election repression significantly narrowed the legal field for democratic organizations and the party system as a whole.

Government’s postelection policy towards a civil society purge froze the party building. In this repressive environment, democratic organizations could hardly convert their political points accumulated during the election period into organizational development. Nevertheless, some of them (the center-rightists) successfully integrated into Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s campaign without losing their party status, and, later, into the Coordination Council for the resolution of the political crisis and the National Anti-Crisis Administration. The Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada and Tell the Truth campaign managed to register their candidates and capture the attention of some moderate critics of the Belarusian leadership.

Politicization of society and the increased number of those hungry for change became a breeding ground for new popular leaders with presidential ambitions eager to form new political parties.

Trends:

Preamble

The Primaries coalition formed to nominate a joint presidential candidate got into the media spotlight in the first months of 2020. The Belarusian Popular Front (BPF), Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada (BSDH), organizing committee of the Belarusian Christian Democracy (BCD) party, United Civil Party (UCP), and For Freedom movement took part in the initiative at the early stages. The parties later found themselves on the sidelines of the protest movement, though. The political agenda was shaped by new leaders and their headquarters, planning to establish democratic organizations without relying on the existing party opposition.

After the election, the registered parties tried to retain their sympathizers or strengthen their positions through concerted actions in the hope of being admitted to negotiations with the authorities as a political entity. The leaders of six opposition parties released a joint resolution with demands addressed to the Belarusian leadership. The resolution was also signed by four parties that had been regarded as loyal to the authorities.

In the second half of 2020, political organizations had to limit their activities amid growing repression that followed the August events. The authorities sought to diminish the mobilization capacity of the parties through repression and threats to revoke registration for their criticism, solidarity and pursuance of the declared agenda, as they wanted violence stopped, political prisoners released, Alexander Lukashenko stepped down, and a new election called.

Party opposition: in the shadow of new leaders and political projects

For the third presidential campaign in a row, the party opposition has been failing to nominate a joint candidate, despite persistent attempts to form an extensive alliance of democratic forces.1 Non-coalition candidates Andrei Dmitriev of Tell the Truth and Sergei Cherechen of the Belarusian Social Democratic Party managed to pass registration as candidates for president thanks to the high activity of the population during the collection of signatures.

Registered political organizations attracted new activists in the post-election period, who, in response to the crackdown, were looking for new legal ways to act.

Since the very beginning of the year, some parties (mostly led by center-rightists) engaged in selecting a joint opposition candidate through primaries, and attempted to form a coalition, involving their nominees, opposition organizations and outside candidates. The parties failed to engage the broad public in the primary voting. Opposition activists, who got quite exhausted by the long confrontation with the authorities before 2020, began communicating with the contenders for the status of a joint candidate during the latter’s field trips.

Traditionally, opposition activists are more determined against the regime. Street leaders with a strident rhetoric against the incumbent president are popular with activists the most, while protest sentiments grew again amid the public discontent.

The joint candidate primaries were initially welcomed by civil society and independent media, but the project was ruined shortly by internal quarrels and scandals. After campaign favorite Pavel Severinets (Belarusian Christian Democracy) withdrew, and so did one of the five candidates Alexei Yanukevich (Belarusian Popular Front), the initiative began losing momentum.

Some participants in the ‘popular vote’ (Christian Democrat Olga Kovalkova, Nikolai Kozlov of the United Civil Party and Yuri Gubarevich of For Freedom movement) tried to use the collection of signatures to strengthen their positions and popularize their organizations, but none of them coped to collect the number of signatures required for registration as presidential candidates. Besides, they initially stated that they would not apply for registration.

While the primaries were going on, most democratic organizations joined efforts in the Right of Choice initiative. The Belarusian Popular Front, the Belarusian Social-Democratic Party, the Greens, the organizing committee of the Party of Freedom and Progress, and the Trade Union of the Radio-Electronics Industry played an active role in the election campaign observation alongside the center-rightists. Despite the high organizational potential, this observation was largely inferior to the new initiatives (‘Golos’, ‘Zubr’, ‘Honest People’) in engaging volunteers, and in terms of influence on the national agenda.

Once the primaries were officially dead, the center-rightists joined Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s election campaign, and then continued cooperating within the Coordination Council and the National Anti-Crisis Administration.

In turn, the registered parties tried to intercept the agenda and offer the authorities their own negotiating venue after Tikhanovskaya was forced to leave the country, and the Anti-Crisis Administration was mopped up. Ten political parties, including those previously considered loyal (four out of seven), published a joint declaration with demands addressed to the Belarusian leadership.2 However, as street protests were fading out, the authorities saw no need to enter into negotiations, and the Ministry of Justice began inspecting the parties-signatories, threatening with their liquidation.

Tell the Truth was sticking to its strategy of transforming into a political party of a moderate opposition nature, and working with groups critical of the regime that were not ready for street confrontation, expecting the system to gradually transform. The organization nominated its leader, Andrei Dmitriev, as a presidential candidate. He managed to obtain registration and attract attention of some advocates of change. In the post-election and street protest period, the campaign has been concentrating efforts on transforming into Our Party.

The Belarusian Social Democratic Hramada grew stronger and attracted supporters by nominating its leader Sergei Cherechen for president, moderately criticizing the incumbent government. Later, Hramada suspended activities, seeing no opportunities under the intense pressure of the state.

The unregistered People’s Hramada led by Nikolai Statkevich tried quite successfully to unite the most determined part of activists, including popular blogger with presidential ambitions Sergei Tikhanovsky. The ‘candidates of protest’ became one of the triggers for the so-called “signature revolution.”3 Even before the election, law enforcers went hard on the party’s activists and put its leaders, including Statkevich, in jail.

Some parties, such as Fair World and some other ones loyal to the authorities, entered sleep mode, waiting for a window of opportunity and political liberalization. To all appearances, many of the hibernating parties have already lost their activists and will hardly be able to report to the Ministry of Justice the necessary minimum of 1,000 party members in case of re-registration. They are unlikely to retain their official status, especially if the authorities decide to transit to managed democracy with a ruling party, and to comb out the political field.

New democratic organizations: popular leaders and ideological neutrality

Society got mobilized to the point when new leaders began to pop up, trying to convert their political capital into organizations and to articulate the interests of previously apolitical social groups that were tired of prolonged economic stagnation and Alexander Lukashenko’s rule. They were mainly focused on the private sector, i.e. small and medium businesses, which account for around 35% of the working population, and not just them.

The new leaders and their teams announced political parties to be formed right after the presidential election or after a democratic transformation of the political regime in Belarus.

Former presidential contender, ex-banker Viktor Babariko confirmed his plan to form Together party after the election, as per his team’s long-term strategy. Babariko was not allowed to run for office, and was jailed. Initially, some democratic organizations, media and experts disapproved of his headquarters’ plan to form a party, believing that this might cause a split in the protest movement. In the post-election weeks, Svetlana Tikhanovskaya established the Coordination Council with several members of Babariko’s headquarters on it. The Council was trusted by many, and hundreds of thousands of demonstrators united by common goals went to the streets of the capital and regional cities.

The founding congress of Together party was postponed more than once for understandable reasons related to repression. Thanks to Babariko’s popularity, the organizing committee managed to attract about 14,000 active supporters: 2,700 applied to join the party within a day since its announcement,4 which showed the high degree of politicization of society and, among other things, the willingness to develop a party system in the country. It is noteworthy that the founders took a rather neutral position regarding the ideological aspects and the party program, which they planned to shape together with their sympathizers.

After Babariko’s team announced the party, another former presidential aspirant Valery Tsepkalo also stated his intent to stay in politics with a political party, but only after a democratic transformation of Belarus. Tsepkalo was less popular in the media than Babariko, and had less influence on the political agenda. He failed to attract as many volunteers as Babariko’s HQ, and his team actually stopped its activities in Belarus after the election. Besides, Tsepkalo was heavily criticized by a large part of the IT community, which was considered by his headquarters as his main target audience.

Since August 2020, diplomat Pavel Latushko has been building his popularity with the protesters, and formed the National Anti-Crisis Administration, which condemned police brutality and harshly criticized the Belarusian leadership. Despite his forced emigration, Latushko confirmed his intent to stay in politics and establish a political party, but only after the political crisis had been resolved. Latushko’s party has a good chance to become a popular political force thanks to the vast experience gained by its potential members, and its leader’s connections in the state machinery, as well as because a considerable part of national democrats agree with his views.

Spoilers: Kanopatskaya’s anti-Russian front and Voskresensky’s repentant “protesters”

Former MP, presidential candidate Anna Kanopatskaya also said she was going to form a political party. She cooperated with a part of Belarusian Popular Front members, and engaged in anti-Russian rhetoric during the 2020 presidential election. However, opposition politicians and independent experts did not consider Kanopatskaya as an independent figure, believing that her only task was to pull in votes of national democrats who might support Babariko and, after his detainment, Tikhanovskaya. Her campaign was largely based on harsh criticism of alternative candidates, whom she called “pro-Kremlin puppets”, which had a negative impact on her reputation among the advocates of change.

Later, former political prisoner Yuri Voskresensky also tried to sow discord within Together party. He said he was going to establish an organization, recruiting former members of Babariko’s headquarters, but only attracted a few dozen activists. He solidarized with the authorities, justified violence and criticized the protest leaders and demonstrators, which made him look bad in the media, so he failed to fill the niche of constructive opposition, shape an opposition agenda, or win support among the protesters.

Sergei Gaidukevich’s Liberal-Democratic Party had to fully side with the regime and support Lukashenko during the acute political crisis. Previously, the LDP tried to distance itself from the ruling elites, and positioned itself as a moderate opposition or a center-right party, seeking to win over those dissatisfied with government’s socioeconomic policies, thus not contesting Lukashenko’s leadership. So Gaidukevich’s long-standing efforts to enlist support of the moderate opponents of the regime were not much of a success. The LDP’s audience is narrowed down to sympathizers of Lukashenko, without any chance to attract the opposition-minded electorate.

Conclusion

Democratic organizations will continue attempts to create alliances and use their connections to maintain positions and strengthen their competitive advantages next to organizations united by popular and charismatic leaders. In the context of rigid repression, the party opposition will continue coordinating efforts with new initiatives and projects of popular leaders.

For most democratic organizations, the loss of official registration is not a determining factor or an obstacle, especially in the situation of legal default, when the official status does not provide guarantees against persecution. However, some parties may halt their activities for the period of harsh repressions and overall uncertainty.

The formation of new political parties (such as Together and Our Cause) is postponed until the opening of a window of opportunity, i.e. democratic transformations and Lukashenko’s resignation, or another period of liberalization, which can be expected after the constitutional referendum.

If the ruling class decides to develop the party system, it will most likely happen as a transition to managed democracy similar to that in Russia. This means toughened discriminatory conditions for most parties and their possible liquidation after re-registration denial, as well as the gradual formation of a ruling party out of one or more loyal parties. However, Alexander Lukashenko keeps looking for simple solutions, and, if he stays in power, he will curb intentions of the political establishment to build a party system, and will postpone political reforms indefinitely.